Abstract-We examine the issue of market foreclosure by airline partnerships with antitrust immunity. Overlapping data on frequency of service and passenger volumes on nonstop transatlantic routes with information on the dynamics of airline partnerships, we find evidence consistent with the airlines operating under antitrust immunity refusing to accept connecting passengers from the outside carriers at respective hub airports. Following the antitrust immunity, airlines outside the partnership reduce their traffic to the partner airlines' hub airports by 4.1% to 11.5%. We suggest regulators should take possible market foreclosure effects into account when assessing the competitive effects of antitrust immunity for airline alliances.
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I. Introduction
A crucial feature of the airline industry is that the level of demand on most city-pair markets is not sufficient to sustain regular nonstop services. The airlines' response has been to operate hub-and-spoke networks, channeling passengers via one or several airports (hubs). While in the domestic U.S. airline industry, most of the travelers do not have to change the operating carrier en route, the situation is different on international markets, where scale and regulatory restrictions do not allow setting up ''mega airlines'' with networks encompassing the entire world. The carriers' response has been to form partnerships to facilitate interline trips by consumers. A number of such partnerships on the routes originating from the United States operate under socalled antitrust immunity. In general, antitrust immunity refers to exemptions from some or all of the antitrust laws granted to firms operating in specific sectors. In the context of international airline partnerships, antitrust immunity allows the partner carriers to cooperatively make scheduling and pricing decisions on the corresponding joint networks; revenue sharing may also be allowed.
We examine whether international airline partnerships operating under antitrust immunity could result in market foreclosure, a practice that generally involves denying the actual or potential competitors access to either an essential input or customers with the intent of extending monopoly power from the bottleneck segment of the market to the potentially competitive segment of the market (Rey & Tirole, 2007) . Antitrust immunity can facilitate market foreclosure, as respective alliance members will be reluctant to accept interline passengers from the outside airlines. In fact, such a concern has been specifically raised by American Airlines: the carrier claimed that it has become more difficult for it to feed its passengers to Air France's flights at Paris Charles de Gaulle airport following the granting of antitrust immunity to the Air France-Delta partnership within the SkyTeam alliance 2 . Foreclosing on the outside carriers can be a rational strategy for the alliance members, as it not only increases their revenue (the passenger spends all his or her money within the alliance) but also lowers their cost through economies of traffic density (and increases the rivals' cost for the same reason). Foreclosure strategies can be implemented by either a direct refusal to deal or by setting prohibitively high fees for accepting such passengers. Whatever the exact mechanism is, the end result will be higher traffic by the partner airlines with antitrust immunity and lower traffic by the outside airlines on routes to and from the partner airlines' hub airports. This is the contention tested in this study. Our empirical strategy involves developing a classification of transatlantic routes relative to hub airports of the airlines that enjoy(ed) antitrust immunity for their partnerships and applying this classification to the data on nonstop frequency and passenger volumes on the transatlantic routes. Our data set covers the period from 1992 to 2008, over which several partnerships fell apart and some airlines changed their alliance affiliation.
The findings of the data analysis are clearly consistent with our hypothesis. Our estimation results indicate that outside airlines carry up to 11% fewer passengers to immunized alliance members' hubs as compared to other routes within their networks. At the same time, antitrust immunity increases traffic on routes operated by the respective member airlines out of their hubs by over 4% (as compared to the otherwise equal outside airlines' services) and leads to a dramatic (up to 25%) increase in total passenger volume on the routes between the alliance members' hub airports. The same effects, about half the size of those estimated for the passenger volumes, are observed for the frequency of flights. At the same time, airlines enjoying antitrust immunity increase their traffic to most of the nonhub end points in their networks. Net effects (in terms of passenger volumes and frequency of service) of this foreclosure vary for different categories of markets and are either ambiguous (at worst implying a small reduction in traffic with potentially anticompetitive outcomes) or indicate higher total traffic.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II characterizes airline alliances and antitrust immunity, followed by a detailed assessment of the relationship between antitrust immunity and market foreclosure in section III. The analysis includes both a brief overview of the economics of market foreclosure and a detailed discussion on the assessment of market foreclosure in airline networks with antitrust immunity. Section IV describes the data and presents the estimation methodology and results. Section V concludes the paper by summarizing the key results and deriving policy implications.
II. Airline Alliances and Antitrust Immunity
Airline partnerships in their modern form appeared in the early 1990s, with airlines coordinating handling of interline passengers through various agreements. The most common and policy-relevant form of such agreements involves code sharing, whereby flights are assigned the partner airlines' flight numbers and are effectively incorporated into those carriers' networks. Such services are often jointly marketed by the partner airlines and are sometimes supplemented with blocked-space arrangements whereby a certain number of seats on the flight are sold directly by the partner airline. Multi-airline code-sharing agreements led to the emergence of global airline alliances, each of which started from a partnership between a U.S. and an EU carrier. Oneworld developed around the partnership between American Airlines and British Airways, SkyTeam evolved from the Delta Air Lines-Air France alliance, and the current Star Alliance is the expanded United Airlines-Lufthansa partnership.
The past ten to fifteen years have witnessed a substantial increase in the size and depth of airline alliances in international air transportation. From the size perspective, more and more individual airlines have decided to join one of the three remaining global airline alliances. For example, while the respective alliances were founded between 1997 and 2000 by 14 airlines, the number of member airlines grew to 52 in 2010: 27 in Star, 13 in SkyTeam, and 12 in Oneworld. The alliances are currently occupying a dominant position on the global aviation market. Specifically, in 2008 the combined worldwide market share of the three mega alliances was about 59%.
3 Airline alliances have particularly high market shares (at least 70%, based on network capacity) on intercontinental markets, such as the market between North America and Europe.
From the depth perspective, members of all three global alliances receive increasingly more freedom in coordinating various aspects of joint operations, including scheduling and pricing decisions, as well as the right to form revenuesharing joint ventures in international markets. On the transatlantic market in 2008, for example, seven of ten flights involved at least one airport used as a hub by an airline participating in airline alliances with antitrust immunity. 4 The granting of antitrust immunity by the respective antitrust authorities is a precondition for the implementation of airline agreements, which involve cooperation on essential competition parameters such as pricing or scheduling.
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Given the identified increase in the size and depth of international airline cooperation, the question of whether such a development is in the interest of consumers immediately suggests itself. Although it is undisputed that consumers gain from airline alliances, it is unclear whether the observed increase in the degree of cooperation is necessary to maximize these benefits. Furthermore, a detailed understanding of the economic effects of airline alliances is pivotal for an overall assessment of the respective costs and benefits for society.
The analysis of airline partnerships in the literature has mostly dealt with the price effects of airline alliances. These studies often do not clearly distinguish between alliances with and without antitrust immunity. Several theoretical models (Park, 1997; Brueckner, 2001; Brueckner & Whalen, 2000) treat alliances as effective mergers. Of the empirical studies of international airline partnerships (Oum, Park, & Zhang, 1996; Park & Zhang, 2000; Brueckner & Whalen, 2000; Whalen, 2007; Brueckner, 2003) only the latter two attempt to empirically distinguish the effect of antitrust immunity on airfares. The general consensus in the literature is that partnerships with immunity benefit interline passengers, who enjoy lower prices due to removal of double marginalization. At the same time, some models (Bilotkach, 2005) suggest that antitrust immunity may not lower interline fares below the level achieved by code sharing. Theoretically, airline partnerships are expected to lead to higher fares for trips between the partners' hub airports; however, empirical support for this contention is weak, partly because the loss of competition comes with substantial efficiency advantages (see Brueckner & Proost, 2010) . 3 International Civil Aviation Organization (www.icao.int); websites of Star Alliance (www.staralliance.com), SkyTeam (www.skyteam.com) , and Oneworld (www.oneworld.com). 4 Computed by the authors from U.S. Department of Transportation T-100 data set for International Airline Services (www.rita.dot.gov).
5 Between 1992 and 2009, the U.S. Department of Transportation investigated 35 applications for antitrust immunity for the international services of various airline alliances. Only three applications were disapproved (American Airlines-British Airways, 1999; American Airlines-British Airways, 2002; Delta Air Lines-Northwest Airlines-Air France-Alitalia-CSA Czech Airlines-KLM, 2006) . Two were pending as of February 2009, and two applications were dismissed on the request of the airlines before a final decision was announced. All of the remaining 28 applications were approved subject to conditions. Excluding the 12 applications of alliances without any involvement of a European carrier leaves 16 approved transatlantic applications for antitrust immunity. All antitrust immunity-granting decisions that fall into the time period covered by our data are described in the appendix.
A recent survey paper on the competitive effects of antitrust immunity by Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2011) points out that beyond the price effects, airline cooperation can affect the nonprice product characteristics, such as schedule coordination and flight frequency, and might also have implications for tacit collusion and network development of the partner airlines. The study also points to the possibility of market foreclosure as a result of antitrust immunity, as previously suggested by theoretical models of Chen and Gayle (2007) and Bilotkach (2007) . Although foreclosure is the focus in the remainder of this study, it is important to state that a regulatory investigation of antitrust immunity for an airline alliance has to take into account all potential procompetitive and anticompetitive effects and must come to a decision by comparing the respective incremental costs and benefits. In other words, evidence for foreclosure strategies being applied by airline alliances under antitrust immunity does not allow us to immediately conclude that the entire alliance immunity agreement is anticompetitive. Such a conclusion can be drawn only from the identification and measurement of all incremental costs and benefits.
III. Antitrust Immunity and Market Foreclosure
Given the brief delineation of airline alliances and antitrust immunity, this section narrows the view down to one specific potentially anticompetitive effect of the granting of antitrust immunity: market foreclosure. The section is divided into a brief review of the economics of market foreclosure, followed by a detailed discussion on why market foreclosure in airline networks with antitrust immunity can be an issue and how it can be assessed empirically.
A. The Economics of Market Foreclosure
According to Rey and Tirole (2007, p. 2148) , market foreclosure refers to ''a dominant firm's denial of proper access to an essential good it produces, with the intent of extending monopoly power from that segment of the market (the bottleneck segment) to an adjacent segment (the potentially competitive segment).'' The tools in the foreclosing firm's toolbox include vertical integration with competitors, refusal to deal, exclusive arrangements, and price discrimination (Steuer, 2008) . In either case, the visible outcome of such interaction is lower quantity (market share) for the firm being foreclosed on. Rational foreclosure strategies do not necessarily have to cause the exit of the rival; however, they have to somehow negatively affect its ability or incentives to compete.
The two basic forms of foreclosure are input and customer foreclosure. In the context of vertical relations, input foreclosure involves the upstream firm restricting access to its input to some of the downstream firms. This raises the corresponding downstream firms' costs, reducing competition and increasing prices at the downstream level. In the case of customer foreclosure, the downstream firm restricts its purchases from some of the upstream firms, leading to a loss in economies of scale-and therefore higher prices-at the upstream level. This in turn allows the downstream firms to raise their prices (Ordover, Salop, & Saloner, 1990 , 1992 Riordan, 1998) . Generally, foreclosure as such is not necessarily an anticompetitive practice, but may very well be socially beneficial as soon as it triggers sufficient efficiencies in the form of cost advantages or helps to avoid excessive entry or free-riding by downstream units (Rey & Tirole, 2007) .
From an antitrust perspective, it is important to differentiate between market foreclosure in general and anticompetitive market foreclosure in particular. While the former term generally refers to the foreclosure mechanics already described, anticompetitive foreclosure additionally demands that consumers are harmed by the foreclosure strategy. 6 As a consequence, the identification of an anticompetitive market foreclosure strategy not only needs to provide convincing evidence on the ability and incentive to foreclose but also has to assess whether such a foreclosure strategy would have a significant detrimental effect on competition downstream (European Commission, 2008) .
The existing empirical studies of market foreclosure confirm the inconclusiveness of theoretical research on the welfare effects of foreclosure. Chipty (2001) examines the effects of vertical integration between programming and distribution in the cable television industry. Her results, on the one hand, suggest that integrated operators tend to exclude rival program services. However, on the other hand, she finds that vertical integration may actually benefit consumers because of the associated efficiency gains. Mullin and Mullin (1997) argue that U.S. Steel's acquisition of one of its suppliers led to substantial efficiency gains rather than market foreclosure. Slade (1998) shows that divestiture of pubs by breweries-effective removal of the possibility to foreclose-yielded higher prices for beer at pubs. More recently, Hortacsu and Syverson (2007) found no evidence of anticompetitive effects of vertical foreclosure in the cement and ready-mixed concrete industries; instead, they suggest that vertical integration yields lower prices and higher quantity and does not create any additional entry barriers. Shenoy (2012) , using an event study analysis covering a large sample of vertical mergers, claims that efficiency (not foreclosure or collusion) is the main rationale for vertical mergers. Derdenger (2009) studies foreclosure effects and efficiency effects in the video game console industry and finds that vertical integration with foreclosure 6 Depending on country legislation, it can be possible to heal anticompetitive foreclosure concerns by providing convincing evidence that the efficiencies potential is substantially larger. As part of such an efficiency defense, the parties typically not only have to verify potential efficiencies but are also committed to show that a significant share of the expected benefits is likely to be passed on to consumers (in the form of lower prices) and that the efficiencies are transaction specific, that is, they are unlikely to be produced or available absent the transaction that raised the anticompetitive foreclosure concerns (see International Competition Network, 2006 The possibility of foreclosure in airline partnerships has been suggested by theoretical contributions. Chen and Gayle (2007) and Bilotkach (2007) both model alliances with antitrust immunity and profit sharing. In either model, where an airline can choose from a variety of potential alliance partners, the airline not chosen as a partner is unable to carry its passengers beyond its network. In the following, we divide our discussion on the assessment of market foreclosure into two sections-the first assuming a simple airline network and the next making use of an extended airline network.
Market foreclosure in a simple airline network. Given the apparent general relevance of foreclosure strategies in airline markets with antitrust immunity, this section develops a framework for assessing foreclosure empirically in international airline markets. The development of an extended airline network that is able to capture many essential characteristics of the actual transatlantic airline networks follows a discussion of foreclosure strategies in the very simple network structure shown in figure 1.
Within the route network structure shown in figure 1, let us assume that airport A is located in the United States and airport B is located in Europe. Airport C is also located in Europe; however, this airport does not offer direct transatlantic connections. As a consequence, customers traveling from C to A would need to travel on an intra-European beyond-the-gateway route, provided on a monopoly basis by airline 1. The transatlantic route is served by two competing airlines. For simplicity, we assume further that airline 1 does not offer transatlantic flights. Without antitrust immunity, airline 1 would have incentives to enter into interline or code-share agreements with both airline 2 and airline 3 aiming to increase traffic on its B-C route. This situation changes if airlines 1 and 2 become members of the same alliance and are granted antitrust immunity. In that case, airlines 1 and 2 are jointly maximizing their profit, and therefore basically behave as one airline. This change in the incentive structure of the two carriers opens possibilities for foreclosure, as it would increase revenue and lower the costs of those two airlines if A-C customers switch from airline 3 to airline 2 for their transatlantic flight. In fact, in the simple network structure shown in figure 1 , A-C customers of airline 3 might be forced to switch to airline 2 (or, alternatively, not to fly at all) in the event that airline 1 refuses to accept passengers from airline 3. This situation immediately suggests a simple hypothesis that is consistent with foreclosure following an airline partnership with antitrust immunity. Specifically, nonalliance carriers will lower their traffic from or into an alliance hub (as they are unable to channel passengers beyond the European hub), while alliance members will increase this traffic. We do admit, however, that foreclosure is not the only strategy that can produce such evidence; we consider possible alternative explanations when discussing the findings of our data analysis in section VB.
Market foreclosure will affect competition on the A-B route. As interline A-C customers switch from airline 3 to airline 2, airline 3's cost increases and those of airline 2 falls due to economies of traffic density. Airline 2 will thus gain market power on the A-B route, which can translate into higher prices charged to the passengers. Thus, market foreclosure in this example leads to a potentially anticompetitive outcome.
Before we continue with the construction of an extended alliance network and the assessment of possible foreclosure strategies, it is important for our further reasoning to connect the general categories of foreclosure discussed in the preceding section to airline networks. In this respect, the discussion of figure 1 reveals that a foreclosure strategy in an airline network technically includes both types of foreclosure: input foreclosure and customer foreclosure. If we focus on a flight from Europe to the United States, the bottleneck input good is the connecting flight from airport C to the transatlantic hub B, while the competitively supplied downstream product is the transatlantic flight. However, if we start the journey in the United States, we have a competitively supplied upstream product (the transatlantic flight) and a bottleneck downstream product (the intra-EU beyond-the-gateway flight). Although this finding is interesting by itself, its relevance for the remainder of the paper is limited for two reasons. First, flights are usually sold in bundles consisting of outbound and inbound flights. Second, the general investigatory steps from an antitrust perspective are identical for both types of foreclosure. In both cases, it must be shown that the foreclosing firm has the ability to foreclose and the incentive to foreclose and that such a foreclosure strategy would have a significant detrimental effect on competition downstream.
With respect to the ability to foreclose, one possibility for airline 1 would be an outright refusal to accept the interline passengers from anyone except the alliance partner. If there are no alternative airlines operating on the route (market power is maximized), applying such a foreclosure strategy would leave the A-C passengers with the choice of traveling with airline 2 or not to travel at all. 7 A similar but more subtle foreclosure option would be to increase the interlining fee for outside airlines (that is, raise the rival's costs) in order to reduce or even eliminate the profitability of interlining for the outside airline. Whatever the exact mechanism, the end result will be higher traffic by the partner airlines with antitrust immunity and lower traffic by the outside airlines on routes to and from the partner airlines' hub airports.
Concerning the incentive to foreclose, foreclosing on the outside carriers can be a rational strategy for the alliance members, as it not only increases their revenue (the passenger spends all his or her money within the alliance), but also lowers their cost through economies of traffic density (and increases the rivals' cost for the same reason) 8 . However, the incentives to foreclose are not equally present in all situations. For example, as Reitzes and Moss (2008) noted, foreclosure will, on the one hand, be more successful the higher the gateway's reliance on connecting traffic, basically because the monopoly of beyond-the-gateway flights creates the possibilities for foreclosure. On the other hand, the possibilities for foreclosure depend on the options for channeling passengers via alternative hub airports. If passengers in city C have no alternative connection on the European side of the Atlantic, the foreclosure possibilities are larger compared to situations in which such alternative routes would exist. The dominance of European flag carriers in serving their respective home countries at least suggests that the ability and the incentives to foreclose these markets are present. This conclusion holds if possible counterstrategies of airline 3 are taken into account. For example, if market entry in the C-B route would be possible relatively easily, a foreclosure strategy would not be implementable for the alliance. However, given the dominance of European flag carriers at their hub airports, together with substantial infrastructure congestion problems, it is reasonable to assume that entry into the main hubs is not an easy undertaking. Furthermore, entry into a few intra-European routes (for example, through a code-sharing agreement with another carrier) would certainly be insufficient for airline 3 to operate profitably. They would need a European carrier of significant size that would be able to distribute incoming traffic to many European cities without a direct connection to the United States.
Finally, it must be shown that a foreclosure strategy could have a significant detrimental effect on competition (not just competitors). An answer to such a question is not necessarily straightforward. Take the A-B market. On this route, foreclosure leads to higher cost for airline 3. It is true that raising a rival's cost strategy may hurt competitors; however, that does not automatically lead to the conclusion that final consumers are also hurt (by prices set above the competitive level). In particular, it is beyond dispute that the granting of antitrust immunity leads to the complete removal of double marginalization, thereby creating a procompetitive cost advantage of the alliance carriers compared to the outside airline.
However, despite the fact that it is unclear to what extent such efficiencies are immunity specific (and cannot be realized by lower degrees of airline cooperation such as codesharing), the existence of efficiencies as such does not rule out the possibility of (larger) anticompetitive effects, especially if the efficiencies come at the cost of increased market power and therefore an enlarged ability and incentive to use that power in an anticompetitive fashion. 9 In other words, although it is typically true that foreclosing on the outside of the partnership carriers enhances efficiency gains of cooperation, it also reduces competition, leaving the sign of the net effect of such a practice ambiguous. Typically the social optimum is not reached in a monopolistic market structure, as at some point, the loss of competition overtops the gains in efficiencies. Furthermore, it is an open question to what extent a dominant firm has incentives to passon realized efficiencies to its customers in the form of lower prices.
Market foreclosure in an extended airline network. Let us now apply our general reasoning to an extended network context to further discuss which markets can be affected by foreclosure at hub airports of the immunized alliance members. Figure 2 depicts such an extended but still simple network with two competing airline alliances. Airports S1, H1, and H2 are located across the Atlantic Ocean from H3, H4, and S2. Let us call the partnership between the airlines operating hubs H1 and H3 alliance 1; alliance 2 members will operate hubs H2 and H4. Then we can define the following types of international markets: Markets between the hubs within an alliance: H1-H3 and H2-H4 routes. Markets between the hubs of competing alliances: H1-H4 and H2-H3. Spoke-overseas hub routes: S1-H3, S1-H4, S2-H1, and S2-H2. In addition to one-stop flight possibilities, we may also have nonstop flights on these markets (not singled out here to keep figure 2 as simple as possible). Spoke-spoke routes: S1-S2. Routes between alliance hubs and nonhub markets, such as the H3-X route in figure 2. Note that the notion of a non-hub market is relative to the alliances with antitrust immunity. In fact, X could be a hub airport of an airline that does not belong to any of the alliances with immunity. For example, X could denote the Philadelphia airport, a hub for US Airways and a Star Alliance member left out of the antitrust immunity deals.
Let us analyze the possibility of market foreclosure on the above-defined routes due to antitrust immunity.
Markets between hubs of the same alliance (H1-H3 and H2-H4 routes) will see traffic gain by the corresponding alliance members. Removal of double marginalization and a consequent drop in the interline fares within the immunized alliance will lead to more passengers using the hub-to-hub route as a segment in their journey. Markets between the hubs of competing alliances (H1-H4 and H2-H3) could experience a drop in nonstop traffic by airlines from both alliances, as antitrust immunity will lead to a reduction in interlining across alliances (interalliance itineraries such as S1-H2-H3-S2 will be replaced by trips within alliances, resulting in fewer passengers in the H2-H3 segment). This may or may not be detrimental to competition and consumer welfare on those markets. While we can expect higher cost for nonstop passengers on those routes through economies of density, the airlines can respond by scheduling fewer flights or using smaller aircraft (or both), mitigating the potentially adverse outcomes. Spoke-overseas hub routes: S1-H3, S1-H4, S2-H1, and S2-H2. Consider the S1-H3 market. We have established that alliance 2's traffic on the H2-H3 route may decrease, while alliance 1's traffic on the H1-H3 route will increase. This may create cost disparity between services of the two competing alliances: per passenger cost on the H1-H3 segment will be lower than on the H2-H3 segment. Also, to the extent changes in traffic volumes are complemented with changes in frequency of service, alliance 1 will obtain a competitive advantage over alliance 2 on this market in nonprice product characteristics. In the most extreme case, alliance 2 may end up closing the H2-H3 segment of its network as it might be unable to operate this market profitably without passengers connecting to S2 via H3. Thus, we see the potential for decreased competition on these markets. At the same time, we cannot say that antitrust immunity leads to foreclosure on those markets. Indeed, alliance 2 airlines are still able to carry passengers on the S1-H3 route internally. Spoke-to-spoke markets (S1-S2) are not affected much by foreclosure, as competition between the airlines is simply replaced by the competition between alliances. It is, however, true that the S1-S2 passengers will now have fewer options, as routings S1-H1-H4-S2 and S1-H2-H3-S2 are no longer available to them. H3-X route, where an alliance member competes with an airline that is not a member of an alliance with immunity is the most important one for our purposes (and is essentially the A-B market depicted in figure 1, placed into the enlarged network context). On this route, formation of alliance with immunity can foreclose the X-S2 market to the carrier that remains outside an alliance, as it is no longer able to channel its traffic via H3.
The net effect of competition between the alliances is increased specialization of individual alliance members on channeling the passenger traffic via the alliance partners' hubs and reduction in traffic to the competing alliance's hub airports. While over the entire network the effect of this network reorganization could be to increase the number of markets served and competition between the alliances may intensify (especially on the spoke-to-spoke markets), we have identified some markets where competition will decrease: markets that include all routes originating and terminating at the hub airport of an immunized alliance member. Our conclusion is actually quite different from the approach regulators have up to now applied to antitrust immunity, where only routes between alliance members' hubs have been considered susceptible to reduced competition with antitrust immunity. Finally, not all airlines are alliance members, and the formation of airline alliances puts those carriers into a clearly disadvantageous position, also decreasing competition on the affected markets. As an example, if we suppose that the H3-S2 route is also served by a nonalliance carrier, the formation of the alliance will decrease competition in this market.
In the end, we can formulate the following testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Airlines without antitrust immunity will serve fewer flights and carry fewer passengers (compared to what they offer elsewhere on their network) on markets involving hub airports of members of alliances that enjoy antitrust immunity. Hypothesis 2: Antitrust immunity is expected to yield lower traffic between the hub airports of members of competing alliances. Hypothesis 3: Antitrust immunity is expected to increase the corresponding airlines' services between their hubs.
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Hypothesis 4: Antitrust immunity is expected to increase the corresponding airlines' services from their hubs to airports that are not hubs of competing alliances.
Of the four hypotheses we formulated, only the first one is related to market foreclosure. Hypothesis 2 reflects rerouting of passengers on hub-and-spoke markets as a result of antitrust immunity. Hypotheses 3 and 4 reflect expansion of the alliance with immunity due to removal of double marginalization and consolidation of traffic within the joint alliance network.
IV. Data
A. Sample and Key Variables
Our main data source is the T-100 data set for international airline services, provided by the United States Department of Transportation. This data set includes monthly information on all nonstop services between the U.S. and the rest of the world. Each entry contains information about the segment's end points, operating carrier, and monthly totals for the number of departures performed, seats offered, and passengers carried on this particular segment. The natural logarithm of monthly departures and passenger volumes, at the airline route level, will be our main dependent variables.
We have set up the sample for data analysis in the following way. From our main data set, we have selected data for travel between the United States and all current EU members, plus Switzerland and Norway, for the years 1992 to 2008. We retained only passenger services and eliminated services with fewer than ten monthly departures.
10 Overall, we ended up with 51,896 observations, spanning 377 nondirectional airport-pair markets and 796 airline-market combinations between 38 U.S. and 57 European airports.
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Our key independent variables are types of airline services, defined according to both the airline's membership in an alliance enjoying antitrust immunity and the end points' status as a hub in one or the other airline's network. Specifically, we differentiate between:
Immunized alliance members' services between their respective hub airports (for example, KLM service from Amsterdam to Detroit, or Delta Air Lines and Air France flights between Paris and Atlanta, after the carriers obtained immunity for their partnership): We will call those alliance services between immunized hubs. In the specifications we will estimate, this category will be denoted by the indicator variable I Altogether, these four categories of markets represent all possible services to and from the hub airports of members of airline alliances with antitrust immunity. The baseline category includes all the services (by all the airlines) outside the hub airports of the alliance members with immunity-services elsewhere on the network. Such services include many of the flights to and from the United Kingdom (such as British Airways' flights to Philadelphia, Seattle, Los Angeles, and Phoenix; American Airlines' flights to London from Los Angeles, Miami, Dallas-Fort Worth, and St. Louis; United Airlines' flights to London from New York); and a lot of the flights by the airlines that do not participate in partnerships with antitrust immunity, such as Continental Airlines and US Airways.
These four categories combined encompass (in 2008) up to 70% of all nonstop services in the data set, as evident from figure 3. That figure starts from 1996 rather than 1992, as 1996 is the first full year when we observe several competing alliances with antitrust immunity (KLM-Northwest partnership; Delta-Swissair-Sabena-Austrian Airlines partnership; as well as Lufthansa-United and Lufthansa-SAS immunity within Star Alliance).
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It can be observed that between 1996 and 2002, there was a steady growth in the share of services involving hubs of alliance partnerships with antitrust immunity; since then, this share has stabilized at about 70%. This implies that seven out of ten flights on the transatlantic markets (US-EU plus Norway and Switzerland) involve either one or two airports used as hubs by the airlines participating in partnerships with antitrust immunity.
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To correctly classify the services in line with the above categories, we need information on both the airlines' hub airports and the time line of antitrust immunity decisions. In addition, we know that some of the airline partnerships that had been granted antitrust immunity were eventually dissolved; therefore it was necessary to determine the corresponding time line as well. The U.S. Department of Transportation's decisions on granting of antitrust immunity are publicly available on the department's web page; we used them to construct the time line presented in the appendix. Internet research on the airlines and alliances web pages revealed the dates of dissolution of partnerships. For the purpose of data analysis, we considered immunized alliances as operational starting from the month following the granting of antitrust immunity until either the month in which the partnership was dissolved or (for currently active alliances) the end of 2008.
Hub airports have been designated based on the structure of the airlines' networks. EU airlines' hubs mostly correspond to the respective countries' capitals (except for Lufthansa, which operates hubs at both Frankfurt and Munich airports; Alitalia, using both Rome Fuimicino and Milan Malpensa as hubs; and SAS, operating hubs at In the data analysis that follows, we use the following control variables. At the country level, we include data on the volume of trade between the United States and each of the European countries. This information is obtained from the IMF; regressions include natural logarithm of trade volume as an independent variable. The following two country-specific dummy variables are also included. First, the Visa Waiver Program indicator variable will be used where such a program is in effect for a given European country (the corresponding information was obtained from the U.S. Department of State).
15 Second, the Open Skies 13 After 2010, with the Continental-United merger and the granting of antitrust immunity to the American Airlines-British Airways partnership, the total share of services involving at least one airport of an alliance member with immunity exceeds 85%.
14 There were no transatlantic services out of Salt Lake City until early 2008. 15 The Visa Waiver Program was introduced in 1986 and allows citizens of certain countries to visit the United States for tourism or business purposes for up to ninety days without a visa. Of the current EU members, only Poland, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Cyprus are not participating in this program.
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Agreement indicator variable will take a value of one where such a treaty is in place (this information is available from the U.S. Department of Transportation). 16 All three variables-higher trade volume, the Visa Waiver Program, and the Open Skies Agreement-are expected to yield higher travel volumes between the United States and a foreign country. However, the effect of each of these variables at the individual route level is unclear, as airlines may open up new routes to a country in response to each of these factors, and the travel volume on some older routes may decline; (for example, if an airline starts serving Stuttgart in addition to Frankfurt, some passengers who used to fly to Frankfurt will now go to Stuttgart, so the passenger volume on flights to Frankfurt may decrease.
The market-level control variables include geometric averages of end points' per capita real income and population, 17 as well as the airport-pair market level HerfindahlHirschman index (HHI), which we calculated directly from the T-100 data set (we will use the index based on passenger volumes). Using geometric averages for demographic variables appears to be standard practice in the literature. We use HHI rather than its logarithm, also following a previous empirical study of determinants of route frequency (Bilotkach, 2011) .
Time-specific heterogeneity will be controlled for by year and month indicator variables 18 . Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of our variables.
As shown in table 1, our data set covers very heterogeneous transatlantic services; some involve mere hundreds of passengers per month, while the largest players carry up to 3,400 passengers daily on a single airport-pair market (equivalent to four round-trips using a fully loaded Boeing 747 aircraft in a conventional two-class configuration). On average, an airline in our sample performs one round-trip per day, with the maximum of about six daily round-trip services. An average service involves about 570 seats offered per day (roughly equivalent to a Boeing 777 or an Airbus A-330 flying round-trip), with about a 75% load factor. Individual markets are rather concentrated as far as nonstop services are concerned. About half of all the services are to countries with which the United States has an Open Skies Agreement. For the entire sample, half of the observations fall into one of the four categories we have defined previously. That is, overall, half of the services involve at least one hub airport of a member of an alliance with antitrust immunity. Notably, the category of services for which we expect that antitrust immunity can lead to evidence consistent with foreclosure (''other services to alliance hubs'' category) represents 17% of all observations, clearly a nontrivial share.
V. Data Analysis and Results
A. Methodology
Our data analysis methodology is based on estimation of the following regression specification:
where:
Y ij is either flight frequency or number of passengers carried by airline i on market j X is the vector of various control variables, as discussed in the previous section IV As we discussed previously, foreclosure will imply lower frequency of service and passenger volumes offered by the outside carriers to hub airports of members of an alliance with antitrust immunity. In terms of the specification, the research hypothesis is that a 4 < 0. This is the main contention tested in our data analysis.
Other hypotheses consistent with removal of double marginalization by antitrust immunity, and corresponding increase in traffic, would be a 1 > 0 and a 3 > 0. We also discussed that routes between the competing alliance members' hubs might be affected by antitrust immunity, which may manifest itself in reduced traffic; however, we also noted that it is not entirely correct to attribute any such traffic reduction to vertical market foreclosure. A priori, however, we expect a 2 < 0.
One methodological challenge we face is market, airline, and airline-market specific heterogeneity, compounded by the fact that many carriers in our sample operate hub-andspoke networks. This network structure implies, among other things, that flight frequency decisions, especially on spoke-hub routes, are not driven by spoke-hub demand but by demand on various spoke-spoke markets, going through the hub. To deal with this problem, we follow Bilotkach (2011) and estimate an airline-airport-pair-market fixedeffects model.
In the airline-market fixed-effects model, the effects we are interested in will be identified by the variation in the relevant variable within a given airline-market cross-section. As an example, consider Delta Air Lines' service from Atlanta to Vienna. This service will be classified in the outside category before antitrust immunity was granted to the Delta-Austrian partnership (January 1992 -June 1996 , as well as after the partnership ended and before the AustrianUnited pair obtained antitrust immunity within Star Alliance (April 2000-January 2001). After Delta-Austrian obtained antitrust immunity and before their partnership ended (July 1996 , this service will be classified as service between immunized hubs. In the period from February 2001 to January 2002, Austrian was a member of a partnership with antitrust immunity, while Delta was not; this implies that Delta service from Atlanta to Vienna will be in the other services to alliance hubs category during this period. In January 2002 Delta Air Lines itself became a part of an alliance with antitrust immunity. From February 2002 until the end of 2008 (as far as our data set spans), Delta's Atlanta-Vienna service will be in the services between competitors' hubs category. Overall, about onethird of all airline-market combinations in our sample move between the above-described categories at least once (the share is higher if we restrict our sample to services of legacy carriers, described below.
To address the potential autocorrelation issue, we estimate a dynamic panel data model where the lagged dependent variable is introduced as a right-hand-side regressor. Yet dynamic panel data models can result in biased coefficient estimates due to the obvious endogeneity in the lagged dependent variable. In order to address this endogeneity threat, we will employ the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator for dynamic panel data. Specifically, we will use the system estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) , which built on and improved the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator. System GMM analysis is specifically designed to address endogeneity issues with dynamic panel data models (biases in the coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent variable). We employ the following specifications. In all cases, first and second lags of the respective dependent variable are used. These are instrumented with third and fourth lags in regressions for the entire sample and third to sixth lags in all other subsamples. These specifications were chosen because they satisfy both of the fundamental conditions for the system GMM estimator: no correlation between the instruments and the residuals (Hansen J test) and no autocorrelation in the residuals (Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation).
Our measure of concentration, HHI, is also endogenous, and we deal with this issue by instrumenting the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with the market-level passenger volume, lagged six months. Generally the literature offers two classes of instruments for HHI: lagged market concentration measures and measures of market size. We opted not to use the former due to an extremely strong correlation between HHI and its lags-over 0.9 for any lags from the first to the twelfth. We lagged the market-level passenger volume because the current month's passenger volume will clearly be correlated with the current unobservable shocks affecting either frequency or passenger volume at the airline-market level. We chose to lag our instrumental variable six months because autocorrelation present in the data may lead to correlation between the current unobservable shock and the market-level passenger volume lagged only one or two months. The correlation between HHI and our instrument of choice is À0.6, which means that our instrument is neither too weak nor too strong.
In addition to running regressions on the entire sample, we perform a series of robustness checks for our results. First, we restrict our sample to services performed by the legacy carriers; these include EU countries' traditional flag carriers and major U.S. airlines. In this way, we eliminate services by smaller and charter carriers, as well as by the airlines from other parts of the world (mostly Asian carriers) performing transatlantic services under the fifth freedom rights. 19 This restriction decreased the number of observations by about 12%. Second, we exclude services to and from the United Kingdom, by far the largest transatlantic market (at the country level). This country's flag carrier, (British Airways, has faced a number of obstacles in trying to obtain antitrust immunity for its partnership with American Airlines, and travel between the United States and the United Kingdom has been subject to some idiosyncratic rules, most notably entry restrictions at London Heathrow airport. 20 Third, to make sure the airlines' potentially nonrandom entry and exit decisions do not bias our results, we restrict our sample to services observed in at least 190 out of 204 possible months. This restriction constrains us to work with 93 airline-market combinations.
B. Results
Results of our data analysis exercise are presented in tables 2 through 4. Table 2 presents results for the airline-market fixed effects two-stage least-squares model, with HHI treated as an endogenous variable, as discussed above. Table 3 reports results for the subsample including steady services (i.e., those observed in at least 190 out of 204 possible months). Table 4 reports the Arellano-Bover dynamic panel GMM estimation results. This model accounts for endogeneity arising from both lagged dependent variables and the measure of concentration. Note also that the values of the Durbin-Watson statistic included in tables 2 and 3 clearly indicate the presence of autocorrelation in fixed-effects estimation, further justifying the use of system GMM.
Our estimation results are consistent with the market foreclosure hypothesis and are robust to excluding nonlegacy carrier services, services to and from the United Kingdom and sporadic services. Fixed-effects estimation suggests antitrust immunity leads to a 4.2% to 5.4% decrease in the frequency of service by the outside carriers serving the newly immunized hub. Specifically, the size of the effect for the entire sample is 4.2%, and up to 5.4% when U.K. services are excluded (see table 2). When only steady services are taken into account, the effect of market foreclosure on frequency of service increases to 5.3% to 7.8% (see table 3 ). The effect on the passenger volumes is generally 1.5 to 2 times the effect on frequency (roughly 6.7% to 9% in table 2 and 9% to 11.5% in table 3), suggesting that excluded airlines switch to a smaller aircraft or end up with lower load factors on their services to the newly immunized hubs.
GMM estimation results, reported in table 4, indicate an effect of a smaller magnitude (1.1% to 1.7% for frequency and 4.1% to 5.4% for passenger volume), with the ratio between the frequency and passenger volume effects of around 3. GMM estimation thus finds that the suspected effects of market foreclosure on passenger volumes are much more pronounced than the same on frequency of service.
Our results for the entire sample imply the following mean effects. Results in table 2 suggest that after granting of antitrust immunity, airlines flying to the hub of the respective alliance member will operate about three fewer monthly flights and carry about 880 fewer passengers per month. The corresponding magnitudes implied by system GMM estimates are much smaller: 0.8 fewer flights and 495 fewer passengers. Interestingly, our results also suggest that traffic lost by the carrier outside of the partnership with antitrust immunity is in part replaced by the hub operator with antitrust immunity (one can see this by comparing the magnitudes of the coefficients on the other services to immunized hubs and other immunized alliance services variables). Overall, however, on routes involving a hub of an alliance member with antitrust immunity, where such a carrier competes with an airline from outside of an immunized alliance (for example, the Amsterdam-to-Philadelphia market, where services over the span of our sample have been offered by KLM and US Airways, the latter carrier staying outside of the alliances with immunity), immunity leads to unchanged or slightly reduced total passenger volume.
Results for the effect of antitrust immunity on services by the corresponding partner airlines out of their hub airports to hub airports of their own alliance partners and to nonhub airports are well in accordance with our expectations. Antitrust immunity leads to a large increase in passenger traffic between the partner airlines' hub airports (from nearly 12% in GMM estimation to over 20% in fixedeffects regressions). Obtaining antitrust immunity also helps the corresponding carriers to add passengers on flights to other airports from their hubs. The size of this effect varies between around 3% (system GMM) and about 4% to 7% (fixed effects).
We also expected antitrust immunity to lead to lower traffic between competing alliances' hub airports. In this dimension, results have not been consistent across specifications. The expected effect is robust only in table 3 (results for steady services); elsewhere, the corresponding coefficient is either positive or not statistically significant. However, the expected decrease in traffic between hubs of competing alliances with antitrust immunity should not be interpreted as consistent with foreclosure.
The results reported in table 5 indicate that antitrust immunity leads to the outside airlines' both reducing their load factors and using smaller aircraft. The carriers not covered by antitrust immunity, when planning their flights to hubs of immunized alliance members, chose to use smaller airplanes in response to falling passenger numbers; at the same time, it appears that the load factors still drop, even with smaller aircraft being used. This can be explained by the fact that the carriers effectively face a lower bound on the size of aircraft, which can be used for transatlantic services; one cannot fly those routes using aircraft smaller than a Boeing 757 or 767, seating about 200 to 250 passengers.
Control variables by and large behave as expected. The relationship between market concentration and frequency Model employed dynamic panel data GMM (Arellano & Bover, 1995) with airline-market fixed effects and lagged market-level passenger volume used as instrument for HHI. Year and month fixed effects included in all regressions but not reported. Heteroskcedasticity consistent White standard errors reported in parentheses. Significant at **5% and *10%.
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and passenger volumes is negative, which is consistent with the findings of other recent studies (Pai, 2010; Bilotkach, Fageda, & Flores-Fillol, 2010) . Open skies agreements sometimes imply a negligible or even a negative effect on frequency, but the effect of market liberalization on the passenger volumes is clearly positive.
In addition to the data analysis exercise for the transatlantic airline market presented here, we have evaluated whether antitrust immunity could yield evidence consistent with market foreclosure in the domestic U.S. airline industry. That is, we investigated whether we would observe a reduction in traffic by the U.S. major carriers into hub airports of the airlines that obtained antitrust immunity for their international partnerships. We did not expect to find such evidence in the domestic U.S. airline industry. With about 650 million passengers traveling domestically per year and only 50 million transatlantic customers annually, it is unlikely that any refusal to accept interline passengers from domestic segments would make a sizable dent on the traffic of outside-of-alliance airlines' traffic to hub airports of carriers enjoying antitrust immunity. This is indeed what we discovered empirically.
Summing up our findings, our data analysis shows that airlines excluded from the partnerships with antitrust immunity end up decreasing their frequency of service and experience lower passenger traffic volumes (mostly due to a lower load factor rather than the use of smaller aircraft) for their services to the immunized alliance members' hub airports. This is consistent with the market foreclosure hypothesis we postulated.
Traffic on routes between the alliance members' hub airports increases substantially following the granting of antitrust immunity. Routes between hubs of competing alliances experience some decline in traffic, but this effect is not as robust and mainly reflects rerouting of passengers, as discussed earlier. Taken together, the two effects suggest 
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS that antitrust immunity strengthens the competitive position of the respective alliance members on transatlantic markets from their hub airports to nonhub gateways. Overall, our results suggest that bringing the possibility of market foreclosure as a result of antitrust immunity into consideration allows us to point to potential anticompetitive effects on markets that have generally been considered immune to lower competition as a result of increased airline cooperation. Specifically, review of antitrust immunity cases has been mostly concerned with the potential for declining competition on markets between hub airports of the partner airlines. It has been believed that airline alliances should not affect competition on routes from alliance members' hub airports to nonhub gateways. We show that this might not be true and suggest that competition on all markets involving a hub airport of a member of an alliance with antitrust immunity might decrease through potential market foreclosure.
Despite the strong evidence that is consistent with foreclosure, it is important to put our results into the perspective of existing research and alternative interpretations. As discussed in section IIIA, theory and empirical evidence suggest that vertical cooperation and integration can result in both market foreclosure and efficiency gains. While the former is likely to reduce output and increase prices, the latter typically has inverted effects. Due to the lack of price and cost data we face in this study, our results do not allow a definite conclusion on the question of whether the granting of antitrust immunity leads to anticompetitive market foreclosure (in the sense that the identified effects overtop possible efficiency gains of antitrust immunity). Furthermore, the evidence we found can be subject to alternative interpretations relating to neoclassical or transaction cost theories. Most notably, antitrust immunity and resulting closer cooperation between the airlines can enable cost savings, which may be passed along to the passenger, making interline services by the respective alliance members more attractive to the travelers. The passengers will then substitute to those services, reducing traffic by the airlines that are not part of the alliance with antitrust immunity. Also, antitrust immunity can increase the cost of interlining with the outside airlines for the alliance member with immunity (but not necessarily for the outside carrier), which could also lead to the outcome we observe. Future studies could shed further light on these alternative explanations for our empirical findings.
Despite this inconclusiveness of our analysis, several industry specifics suggest that antitrust authorities are well advised to consider possibilities of market foreclosure in their examination of the competitive effects of antitrust immunity of airline alliances (see generally section IIIB for a detailed discussion). First, market power effects of especially European flag carriers are substantial with respect to both their home market and their main hubs. This finding not only suggests a substantial power of these alliances over price but might also imply reduced incentives to passon possible efficiencies downstream to the final consumer. Second, lower degrees of cooperation, such as, code-sharing agreements, already allow reaping a substantial fraction of the benefits of international airline cooperation (see Brueckner et al., 2011 , for the most recent evidence on this effect). As a consequence, the incremental efficiencies realized after the granting of antitrust immunity are likely to be substantially smaller than the entire benefits of airline cooperation. In addition, it is important that even the identification of anticompetitive foreclosure would not allow the immediate conclusion that antitrust immunity should not be granted. Such a decision has to be based on a comparison of all incremental costs and benefits triggered by such agreements (see Bilotkach & Hüschelrath, 2011) .
VI. Conclusion
Theoretical research and practical antitrust investigations have suggested that members of international airline partnerships might have the ability and the incentive to foreclose the beyond-the-gateway markets to the airlines excluded from the respective alliance. It has also been argued that such foreclosure will likely be most effective when alliance partners have the right to jointly set fares for the interline services, and engage in revenue-sharing arrangements, a privilege otherwise known as antitrust immunity. This paper assesses whether the evidence from the transatlantic airline market can be considered consistent with such market foreclosure and quantifies the corresponding effects.
We conduct an extensive analysis of the data on nonstop services on the transatlantic scheduled commercial passenger airline market. Merging the data with the information on the structure of the airlines' networks and the dynamics of the airline partnerships on the same market from 1992 to 2008, we analyze whether the airlines enjoying antitrust immunity take steps to keep interline traffic within their alliance. We find that antitrust immunity leads to a 4.2% to 5.4% (1.1% to 1.7% in dynamic panel data GMM estimation) decrease in frequency of service by the non-alliance carriers serving a newly immunized hub. The effect on the passenger volumes is even greater (6.7% to 11.5% drop in fixed effects, 4.1% to 5.4% in GMM, and generally 1.5 to 2 times the effect on frequency). This implies that excluded airlines switch to smaller aircraft or end up with lower load factors on their services to the newly immunized hubs.
Our empirical results suggest that antitrust immunity may lead to reduced competition on all markets (whether nonstop or onestop) involving alliance members' hub airports. In particular, in cases where an immunized alliance member competes with a nonalliance carrier, antitrust immunity results in increased market share inequality and potentially lower total traffic. Note that the literature up to now has considered only markets for travel between alliance members' hub airports as candidates for lower competition following antitrust immunity. We effectively expand 1383 AIRLINE ALLIANCES, ANTITRUST IMMUNITY, AND MARKET FORECLOSURE the set of markets where antitrust immunity may yield losses to the traveling public.
More generally, our study presents evidence that is somewhat contrary to what is found in the general empirical literature on market foreclosure. Most studies suggest that foreclosure either appears to be procompetitive or neutral in terms of its welfare effects. Our results suggest that foreclosure may have anticompetitive effects, depending on characteristics of the markets in question. Admittedly, we are unable to analyze the price effects of potential market foreclosure. Moreover, evidence we report here is subject to alternative interpretations, such as antitrust immunity bringing about cost efficiencies, which are passed along to travelers in the form of lower airfares, resulting in passengers switching away from the nonalliance product. However, an antitrust authority that simply ignores possible foreclosure strategies when investigating the competitive effects of antitrust immunity for airline alliances is likely to miss out an opportunity to increase the benefits of its activities for the consumers, for example, by imposing remedies to heal anticompetitive foreclosure concerns.
